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Value added as the Tax Base For Enterprise Income 
 
    By Nicos ZAFIRIS 
   Groupe INSEEC, London, UK  
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The paper addresses the long standing asymmetry in the tax treatment of debt and equity 
costs through a direct comparison of two hypothetical regimes based exclusively on 
income taxation, broadly defined, and value added taxation. The model presented widens 
existing debate to encompass the choice between entrepreneurial and contractual use of 
inputs generally and including labour, as well as capital. Using representative functional 
forms and numerical illustrations the analysis explores the effect of the tax regimes on 
firm decisions concerning input selection, output level and vertical integration. The 
greater neutrality of value added taxation is shown to produce gains in terms of firm 
efficiency in production and concentration on competitive advantage.  
 
Keywords: Residual income, income tax, value added tax, tax shield, neutrality, vertical 
integration 
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Value Added as the Tax Base for Enterprise Income 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The recent recession was characterised, in no small measure, by limitations in the 
availability of loans, especially to small businesses. Such limitations are discouraging for 
business investment. For loans, apart from helping to overcome shortages of equity 
finance, are also advantageous due to the deductibility of interest under the typical 
income tax regime, an advantage clearly foregone in the absence of a loan. The tax 
deductibility of wage costs however confers an equivalent tax advantage compared with 
the use of the entrepreneur’s own labour. The favourable, in principle, effects of this on 
employment have attracted rather less attention.  
 
Fundamental to the present discussion is the differentiation, in the Knightian 
tradition of entrepreneurship, between the contractual employment of either or both of 
loan capital and hired labour, and the entrepreneurial employment of either or both of 
equity capital and own labour. The entrepreneurial category is characterised by 
remuneration from residual enterprise income, after deduction of contractual costs. 
Taking together tax relief on both contractual inputs, it is clear that income taxation 
generally favours the use of these. Correspondingly it discriminates against the use of 
own (or externally obtained) equity capital but also against own (or other) labour engaged 
on entrepreneurial terms.  This is a ‘distortion’ of the choice between entrepreneurial and 
contractual use of resources. In contrast, taxation of value added is neutral in this respect. 
 
The asymmetric treatment by the UK tax system, among others, of debt and 
equity finance is pointed out by Meade (1978) who also highlights a great variety of ways 
in which the system has treated interest in different circumstances.1 The idea of using 
value added as the main base of the ‘Expenditure Tax’ mooted at that time was indeed 
considered as one option by Meade (1978).  30 years later, Auerbach et al (2008) 
reminded that the issue was still live.2 
 
More recently public discussion has centred on international ‘competition’ to 
offer footloose business a favourable corporate tax regime, and well publicised cases of 
multinationals paying little or no corporation tax in some jurisdictions. We mention, 
indicatively, Schoemaker and Goodhart (2010)3 and McCrae (2015),4 as this aspect will  
not be pursued here.  
                                                 
1 See pp 55- 63 onwards.  
 
2 They write: “We point out that avoiding inconsistent treatment of debt and equity in 
the tax system has become an even more important issue since its discussion in the Meade Report, as the 
boundaries between the two forms of financial instrument have become increasingly blurred” (Executive Summary). 
3 “A removal of interest deductibility should be done in an international context. A first reason is to keep the playing 
field level. A second is to reduce the scope for circumventing the tax rules…The main objection to removing the 
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More interest currently, however, is centred on the United States. At the time of 
writing the Ben Cardin Progressive Consumption Tax Act (PCTA) would introduce a 10 
percent value-added tax (VAT), while also cutting both individual and corporate income 
taxation. The PCT would require businesses to collect consumption tax imposed on the 
goods and services they sell or distribute, and claim a credit for the consumption tax they 
previously paid on inputs. Possible complaints that such a system is regressive would be 
dealt with through a PCT rebate, and important benefits would be retained in a much 
simpler income tax code. In addition, it is suggested that it would be possible to reduce 
the headline corporate rate by more than half, from 35 percent to 17 percent.  
The interest ‘tax shield’ is treated in textbooks as part of an optimisation exercise. 
That is, leverage (gearing) is taken up to the point where the cost of the risk of distress 
overtakes the tax advantage. Distress risk increases as the equity ‘buffer’, and its ability 
to absorb losses, is weakened. But the tax disadvantage of the equity tends to be conflated 
with the premium that it would attract on account of is ‘residual status’ to result in an 
overall perception that equity is ‘more expensive’ than debt. 
Much of the current discussion takes for granted the need to rely to a significant 
extent on some measure of income, alongside, or instead of, other tax bases. But 
ambiguities in the definition of ‘profit’ or  ‘net business income’, notably as between the 
‘economic’ and ‘accounting’ definitions, point towards a need to deemphasise the role of 
income generally as the tax base.5 
Reform proposals generally centre on the abolition of the debt tax shield, while 
the possibility of extending tax relief to dividends, to put these on a par with debt interest, 
is sometimes mooted. Rare is any mention of the possibility of also exempting 
entrepreneurial labour on a par with contractual (wage) labour. The difference between 
the cost of dividends and the costs of the residual remuneration of entrepreneurial labour, 
from our perspective here, is the ‘explicit’ character of the former. While tax relief on 
dividends may be seen as a practical possibility, extension of relief to the ‘implicit’, or 
‘opportunity’, costs of entrepreneurial labour (and indeed of entrepreneurial capital in so 
far as not fully reflected in the dividends) is generally not. One may surmise also that 
another reason for this is the need to preserve a sizeable base for income taxation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
interest deductibility is that it would sharply raise the overall tax costs of corporates. This could, at least in principle, be 
addressed by allowing a lower tax deductibility both on interest and dividends at the same rate that would keep the net 
tax payment of corporates to government at the same level”. 
4 He observes: “One obvious win to be to remove incentives for companies to add to debt rather than to equity capital. 
It is a bit ridiculous that owners are encouraged to load debt on to companies, thereby cutting corporation tax liability, 
while dividends on equity capital are highly taxed. But that would need international cooperation – not easy”. 
 
5 The conventional ‘economic’ profit has been revived in the more recent development of ‘Economic Value Added’ 
(EVA) by Stern Stewart and related literature. Some accounting arbitrariness, or tax avoidance, may creep into the 
definitions of contractual and entrepreneurial employment to the extent that entrepreneurs  may pay themselves fixed 
‘salaries’ for part or even all of their income, thus making it tax deductible. See also Zafiris and Bayldon (2000). It 
should be noted that ‘value added’, as in EVA, is a very different concept from the base of value added taxation and 
should not be confused with it.  
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‘Economic profit’ (which would become the base after deduction of all costs, explicit, or 
implicit) would be a relatively small residual magnitude, normally positive but quite 
possibly negative. The tax would then be assessed on a very narrow base.   
The case for a switch to value added taxation is made by Auerbach et al (2010). 
They suggest replacing corporation tax with a (destination basis) value added tax, albeit 
with deduction of labour costs. Yet that proposal also may suffer from the resulting 
narrowing of the tax base, a broader tax base would require inclusion of labour costs. But 
as pointed out by Crossley et al (2009),6 very broad based taxes on expenditure would 
shade, in terms of their overall effects, into taxes on income. This would undermine the 
common, albeit erroneous, belief that value added taxation is neutral in terms of work 
incentives. This aspect, also discussed in Crossley et al (2009) is beyond the scope of the 
present work.  
The choice between income/corporate and value added taxation choice is always 
present, implicitly,  in tax policy, to the extent that reduced rates and increased 
exemptions on income taxes create pressures on the rates and exemptions regime of value 
added taxation, among other alternatives. Alongside the neutrality argument however, the 
case for a significant switch from income to value added is also made on the strength of 
the purported verifiability advantages of the latter, compared with the avoidance/evasion 
potential of the former. 
A further aspect of value added taxation is generally unrecognised. While 
affecting uniformly all the factor incomes generated within the enterprise, such taxation 
still excludes the costs of materials and/or semi finished products. This would seem to 
encourage greater efficiency of specialisation by limiting activity within the firm to what 
the firm does best, i.e. focusing on its distinctive competitive advantages. 
                                                 
6
 They write: “Contrary to first appearances, VAT has the same economic impact as a suitably structured income tax. 
To see this, consider two very simple tax systems: one with a uniform rate of income tax of 20% and the other with a 
uniform VAT of 25%. For simplicity’s sake, assume that there is no borrowing or saving. An individual earning 
£10,000 would pay £2,000 in income tax under the income tax system, whilst his £10,000 expenditure would include 
£2,000 of VAT under the other system. In this instance, the uniform VAT and income tax are exactly equivalent – both 
allow the consumption of £8,000 of actual goods and services – and would therefore be expected to have the same 
behavioural impact.” 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents a model to 
maximise a specific profit function in a regime where no tax applies. The exercise is 
repeated in section III for a proportional income tax regime and the respective optima are 
compared, allowing also for a change in gearing.  Section IV undertakes the same 
analysis for the alternative regime based on an equalent rate value added tax and the 
results are compared with those of section III. In section V the choice of vertical 
integration is addressed relaxing earlier assumptions about intermediate input purchases. 
Section VI discusses a measure of residual income volatility The results are drawn 
together in the concluding section VII. 
 
 
II. Definition of Profit and Maximisation in a no Tax Regime 
 
 
The firm maximises ‘economic’ profit, i.e. revenue net not only of the explicit 
costs of contractual inputs but also net also of the implicit ones of own (entrepreneurial) 
resources.7 Denoting such profit as πe, and in the absence of taxation, the firm would 
work with a function of the basic form   
 
feeffcfcffe
hLrKwLiKQP   (1) 
where Kcf, Kef, Lcf, and  Lef are the amounts of capital and labour employed 
entrepreneurially and contractually in (final stage) production. Thus the total capital 
utilised is Kf  = Kcf + Kef  and total labour is Lf = Lcf + Lef. Final output Qf  is a function of 
the inputs i.e. Qf = Qf (Kf, Lf).  Let Pf  denote the exogenously determined price of the 
firm’s final output (firm is a price taker). Let i and r be the unit costs of contractual and 
entrepreneurial capital respectively.  
 
Specific functional forms have been selected for purposes of illustration. Final 
output is governed by a Cobb Douglas production function with a degree of homogeneity 
below 1.8 Thus  
5.025.010 fff LKQ    (2) 
The unit capital costs i and r, representing Average Factor Costs (AFCs) although taken 
as externally determined, would also be subject to some differentiation as a result of the 
                                                 
7 Although (1) is the objective function that should be maximised in principle, it may just not be the behaviourally 
relevant one, to the extent that the firm’s owners mistook the accounting calculation of the residual income as the 
function to maximise. This possibility will not be pursued further in what follows. 
 
8 The reason for this is to ensure that the optimisation problem has a finite solution for the output and the inputs. Linear 
homogeneity would make for indefinite expansion of output, so long as inputs increased at the same pace, unless 
expenditure on the inputs were constrained by a limited budget. Arguably that, too, is a plausible scenario for a firm 
faced with such a constraint at a particular decision time, possibly to be replaced by a larger or smaller, but still limited, 
budget at another decision point. 
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firm’s own choice of gearing g = Kcf / (Kcf + Kef) and hence 1–g = Kef / (Kcf + Kef).9  Here 
both AFCs are increasing functions of gearing g of the form  
 
2246 ggi    (3) 
and       
2
2412 ggr    (4) 
Although both i and r rise by the same factor as g rises, it will be noted that (3) 
has a higher starting point, reflecting the cost of capital of an equity-only firm (g = 0).  
Eq (3)  has a final value of 12 at g = 0 , for a theoretical debt-only firm. The cost of the 
ever shrinking equity tends to a limit of 18 under eq. (4).10 The optimisation of the 
gearing is an exercise ‘nested’ within the profit maximization problem and in principle 
should be needs to be tackled simultaneously with it. Viewing it separately for now, it 
means that the firm would  aim to minimise the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC), which occurs at g = 0.5.  Profit maximisation however requires determination 
of the marginal costs (MFCs) of debt and equity or, strictly, the marginal aspect of 
WACC, a more complex concept, full discussion of which will not be undertaken here. 
For present purposes, and in view of the interdependence of the two forms of capital costs 
due to gearing, we shall follow Wang (1994) in defining WMCC, the weighted average 
of the marginal costs, to be the relevant MFC of both Kcf  and Kef. A property of WMCC 
is that it equals WACC at the minimum point of the latter.11 
 
The relationship between the various aspects of unit capital costs, as defined here, 
is presented in Table 1. The expressions and valueswhich illustrate the examples 
appearing in the discussion are highlighted . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Gearing in finance is defined in terms of debt and equity values, rather than factor quantities as here. This issue may 
be overcome, for simplicity’s sake, if the market price of a unit of physical capital is taken to be 1, as at the time of 
decision making. 
 
10 The numbers selected are such as to allow possible interpretation as percentage rates of return. 
 
11 See Appendix for proof of the general marginal/average relationship.  For a more accurate definition of WMCC and 
a full discussion see Zafiris (2016) 
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Table 1: Average and marginal factor costs 
g a b c di/dg = g - g
2
AFC c= i AFC e= r WACC MFC c MFC e WMCC
= b + 2cg
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0 6 4 2 4 0 6 6
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0 12 4 2 4 0 12 12 12 12
0.8i 4.8 12 4.8 12
0
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0.1 6 4 2 4.4 0.09 6.42 6.816
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0.1 12 4 2 4.4 -0.09 12.42 11.82 12.024 11.5032
0.8i 5.136 11.6916 5.4528 11.36688
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0.2 6 4 2 4.8 0.16 6.88 7.648
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0.2 12 4 2 4.8 -0.16 12.88 11.68 12.112 11.2192
0.8i 5.504 11.4048 6.1184 10.91328
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0.3 6 4 2 5.2 0.21 7.38 8.472
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0.3 12 4 2 5.2 -0.21 13.38 11.58 12.288 11.1432
0.8i 5.904 11.1372 6.7776 10.63488
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0.4 6 4 2 5.6 0.24 7.92 9.264
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0.4 12 4 2 6.6 -0.24 13.92 11.52 12.336 11.1072
0.8i 6.336 10.8864 7.4112 10.36608
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0.5 6 4 2 6 0.25 8.5 10
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0.5 12 4 2 6 -0.25 14.5 11.5 13 11.5
0.8i 6.8 10.65 8 10.50
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0.6 6 4 2 6.4 0.24 9.12 10.656
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0.6 12 4 2 6.4 -0.24 15.12 11.52 13.584 11.8272
0.8i 7.296 10.4256 8.5248 10.54848
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0.775 6 4 2 6.8 0.174375 10.30125 11.487
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0.775 12 4 2 6.8 -0.174375 16.30125 11.65125 15.1155 12.30341
0.8i 8.241 10.0545563 9.1896 10.52293
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0.8 6 4 2 7.2 0.16 10.48 11.632
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0.8 12 4 2 7.2 -0.16 16.48 11.68 15.328 12.3712
0.8i 8.384 10.0032 9.3056 10.51008
 i = a + bg + cg
2
0.9 6 4 2 7.6 0.09 11.22 11.904
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
0.9 12 4 2 7.6 -0.09 17.22 11.82 16.536 12.3672
0.8i 8.976 9.8004 9.5232 10.2245
 i = a + bg + cg
2
1 6 4 2 8 0 12 12
r = a  + bg  + cg
2
1 12 4 2 8 0 18 12 18 12
0.8i 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6  
 
 
Let also w and h be the opportunity unit costs of contractual and entrepreneurial labour Lc 
which are taken as fixed. Although a ‘gearing’ aspect may also be defined as between 
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contractual and entrepreneurial labour, all the costs associated with the extra risk of the 
residual position are treated here as absorbed by the capital inputs.12 
A final feature to be introduced here will allow for an intermediate input or semi 
finished product Qb. Although not part of the firm’s value added (VA) the input is 
necessary to achieve the final output. Given technology, Qb will be needed on a one for 
one basis with Qf . It is assumed available to be bought externally at a unit cost Pb. As 
only Qf   generates revenue, VA would be PfQf  – PbQb .The firm may however choose to 
produce the semi finished input internally (Qs), if it can do so at a unit cost lower than Pb. 
At this stage in the discussion  PbQb is taken to be constant. But profit must be computed 
net also of the cost of the bought in semi finished input. Defining a ‘net price of Pn = Pf  - 
Pb , the profit function now becomes  
 
efefcfcffne hLrKwLiKQP     (5) 
The decision variables of the problem of maximising (5) are the four inputs contributing 
to final production, namely Kcf,  Kef , Lcf and Lef . The first order conditions (FOCs) are 
 
0
)(






cf
cf
f
f
n
cf
e
dK
iKd
K
Q
P
K

   (5.1) 
 
0
)(






ef
ef
f
f
n
ef
e
dK
rKd
K
Q
P
K

  (5.2) 
 
0





w
L
Q
P
L f
f
n
cf
e    (5.3) 
 
0





h
L
Q
P
L f
f
n
ef
e     (5.4) 
 
It will be noted that, while the MFCs of capital and labour are differentiated as 
contractual or entrepreneurial, the respective Marginal Revenue Products (MRPs) are not, 
since the factors’ physical productivity is not affected by the mode of their employment. 
The MRP of capital cannot of course be equated simultaneously with different MFCs, 
unless these happened to be equal by coincidence. To overcome this we will treat the 
WMCC, as defined earlier, as the relevant MFC for both Kc and Ke. The same dilemma 
would apply to the two categories of labour input unless their costs, too, happened to be  
equal. Again, it is necessary to apply weighted averaging to marginal labour costs by 
establishing a WMCL, analogously with the WMCC. It seems reasonable to adopt the 
same level of ‘gearing’ for both inputs. Once these adjustments are made the four 
equations reduce to only the following two.  
 
                                                 
12 Entrepreneurial labour emoluments may not always be higher than contractual, especially in adverse circumstances 
when residually remunerated workers may be more flexible in accepting a pay squeeze. 
9 
 
0





WMCC
K
Q
P
K f
f
n
f
e    (5.5) 
 
 
0





WMCL
L
Q
P
L f
f
n
f
e    (5.6) 
     
The earlier expressions of equations (2), (3) and (4) now have to be substituted 
into (5). Assumed numerical values of Pf = 10, Pb = 1.25, w = 10 and h = 10 are also 
inserted. The FOCs then take the following specific forms 
 
   5.11))(25.0(5.87 5.075.0 

  LK
K f
e   (6.1) 
  10))(5.0(5.87 5.025.0 

 LK
L f
e   (6.2) 
Dividing both sides of (6.1) by (6.2) yields L = 2.3K , hence an optimal L/K ratio 
of 2.3. Substituting 2.3K for L back into (6.1) yields an optimal K = 69.25, hence an 
optimal L = 159.28, approximately. The firm is assumed to be minimising WACC, thus 
selecting g = 0.5 and dividing the total K equally between  Kcf and Kef . Let us also 
hypothesise for now that the equal amounts of Lcf and Lef would be selected to make up 
the total L.   
 
The example is summarised in Table 2, the entries of which are meant to be self 
explanatory. The variables are listed in the first column on the left and defined, as 
necessary, in the second column, with assumed numerical values inserted and derivatives 
computed for the specific forms selected. The optimal calculation in the no tax regime is 
set out in the first column of calculations headed ‘No Tax’ , while the remaining columns 
will show the results under the tax regimes to be discussed in the next two sections. The 
marginal magnitudes which need to reach equality in each column are highlighted. 
Correctness of the calculations is confirmed through the equality of the MRP of capital 
(= 11.5) with the WMCC of capital and similarly equality of the MRP of labour (= 10) 
with the MFCs of Lcf and Lef , each of which has been assumed to have fixed unit costs of 
10.13  
 
 
Table 2: The profit maximising calculation 
                                                 
13 An alternative, or auxiliary, procedure is to approximate the optimal values of the decision variables by trial and 
error around a plausible starting point and continuing until the relevant marginal products and costs reach equality. The 
procedure can be mildly entertaining for a while but becomes rather tedious eventually. 
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Variable = ..  (Definition/formula) No Tax Inc Tax Inc Tax with VA Tax
gearing adjustmt
Q f 10(K cf  + K ef)
0.25
(L cf  + L ef)
0.5
364.0048 252.0144 311.7770 231.2771
P f 10 10 10 10 10
K cf 34.6 21 48.024 18.9
K ef 34.6 21 5.336 18.9
K f K cf + K ef 69.2 42 53.36 37.8
g K cf /(K cf+K ef) 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.5
i 6 + 4g + 2g
2
8.5 8.5 11.22 8.5
iK cf 294.1 178.5 538.8293 160.65
r 12 + 4g + 2g
2
14.5 14.5 17.22 14.5
rK ef 501.7 304.5 91.8859 274.05
L cf 79.64 49 119.76 43.5
L ef 79.64 49 13.31 43.5
L f L cf + L ef 159.28 98 133.07 87
w 10 10 10 10 10
wL cf 796.4 490 1197.6 435
h 10 10 10 10 10
hL ef 796.4 490 133.1 435
t 0 OR 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0
1 - t 1 0.8 0.8 1
v  0  OR  t(P fQ f  - iK c - wL c - P b Q b )/(P fQ f - P b Q b ) 0 0 0 0.1411
1 - v 1 1 1 0.8589
P n∂Q f /∂K f P n 2.5(K cf  + K ef)
-0.75
(L cf  + L ef)
0.5
11.5067 13.1258 12.7813 13.3841
(1 - t)P n∂Q f /∂K f (1 - t)P n 2.5(K cf  + K ef)
-0.75
(L cf  + L ef)
0.5
11.5067 10.5006 10.2251 13.3841
(1 - v)P n∂Q f /∂K f (1 - v)P n 2.5(K cf  + K ef)
-0.75
(L cf  + L ef)
0.5
11.5067 13.1258 12.7813 11.4952
P n∂Q f /∂L f P n )5(K cf  + K ef)
0.25
(L cf  + L ef)
-0.5
9.9982 11.2506 10.2504 11.6303
(1 - t)P n∂Q f /∂L f (1 - t)P n 5(K cf  + K ef)
0.25
(L cf  + L ef)
-0.5
9.9982 9.0005 8.2003 11.6303
(1 - v)P n∂Q f /∂L f (1 - v)P n 5(K cf  + K ef)
0.25
(L cf  + L ef)
-0.5
9.9982 11.2506 10.2504 9.9889
WACC gi  + (1 - g)r 11.5 11.5 11.82 11.5
WACC w inc tax relief g(1- t)i + (1 - g)r 11.5 10.65 9.8004 11.5
d(iK cf)/dK cf i + (4+ 4g)(g - g
2
) 10 10 11.904 10
(1 - t)d(iK cf)/dK cf (1 - t)[i + (4+4g)(g - g
2
)] 10 8 9.5232 10
d(rK ef)/dK ef r +(4 + 4g)[-(g - g
2
)] 13 13 16.536 13
 WMCC [i + (4 + 4g)(g - g
2
)]g + [r +(4+ 4g)[-(g - g
2
)](1 - g)  11.5 11.5 12.3672 11.5
 WMCC w inc tax relief (1 - t)[i + (4 + 4g)(g - g
2
)]g + [r +(4 + 4g)[-(g - g
2
)](1 - g)  11.5 10.5 10.2245 11.5
d(wL cf)/dL cf w 10 10 10 10
(1 - t)d(wL cf)/dL cf (1 - t)w 10 8 8 10
d(hL ef)/dL ef h 10 10 10 10
WMCL gw + (1 - g)h 10 10 10 10
WMCL w inc tax relief g(1- t)w + 1 - g)h 10 9 8.2 10
P fQ f 3640.0483 2520.1440 3117.7697 2312.7707
P b 0.125P f   1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
P n 0.875P f  8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75
Q b Q f  364.0048 252.0144 311.7770 231.2771
P b Q b 455.0060 315.0180 389.7212 289.0963
TC f iK cf  + rK ef  + wL cf + hL ef + P b Q b 2843.6060 1778.0180 2351.1364 1593.7963
Π e P n Q f - iK cf  - rK ef  - wL cf  - hL ef 796.4423 742.1260 766.6333 718.9744
Π e  CHECK P fQ f - TC f 796.4423 742.1260 766.6333 718.9744
Π a (P n Q f - iK cf- wL cf ) 2094.5423 1536.6260 991.6192 1428.0244
T t(P n Q f - iK cf- wL cf ) 0.0000 307.3252 198.3238 0.0000
Π te (1 - t)(P n Q f - iK cf- wL cf) - rK ef - hL ef 796.4423 434.8008 568.3095 718.9744
VA  P n Q f 3185.0423 2205.1260 2728.0485 2023.6744
VAT  vP n Q f 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 285.6049
Π ve (1 - v)(P n Q f ) - iK cf  - wL cf  - rK ef - hL ef  796.4423 742.1260 766.6333 433.3695  
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The last few entries in the first column calculate the profit achieved, in this case a 
healthy rate of over 20% of revenue. One reason for this is the relatively low cost Pb 
assumed for the intermediate input at 0.125 of the final product price Pf.  
 
 
III. Firm Decisions under Income Taxation 
 
At the risk of some oversimplification we shall subsume under ‘income tax’, for 
purposes of this discussion, the entire range of taxes assessed on the firm’s income or 
capital, as opposed to taxes assessed on its sales. That is we lump together not only 
personal income tax on dividends and corporation tax but also (later) capital gains taxes 
on retained earnings and in principle also (eventual) inheritance taxes on bequeathed 
assets. E.g. there is some interchangeability between being taxed on ‘profit’ and 
transferring some income to a fixed ‘base salary’ which would be (tax deductible). Any 
net tax advantage would depend of course on the relative taxation of such ‘salaries’ and 
‘profits’. Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004) discuss similarities of all taxes along that 
continuum in their effects on individual entrepreneurs, essentially adverse ones on effort, 
more on which later. Some modelling is on the assumption that the entire income may be 
received as capital gains. Simplification here is also dictated by the style of modelling 
attempted in this paper. 
 
Let t now be the rate of income tax, assumed equal to 0.2. Profit after income tax 
(πet) to be maximised would now be  
 
efefcfcffnte
hLrKwLiKQPt  ])[1(   (7) 
It should be recognised, for the avoidance of any confusion, that the tax is not 
assessed on the above expression of (7) but on the ‘accounting’ measure of the residual 
income, that is only on the square bracketed expression in (7).  As already suggested, the 
‘economic’ definition of (7) is a smaller magnitude than the ‘accounting’ one, to the 
extent of the deduction of the last two terms in (7).  
 
Table 1 shows also the values of unit capital costs under the income tax relief 
(rows labelled 0.8i).  It will be noted that while WACC has a minimum at g = 0.5 under 
no tax, once the tax relief is allowed for it does not reach a minimum until the 
implausible value of g = 1. WMCC had in the absence of tax has a starting and finishing 
value of 12, dropping below that value in intermediate ranges of g. But it too, once the 
tax relief is included, it reaches a minimum of 9.6 at g = 1. 
 
Under the postulated functional forms and values of exogenous variables, and 
after rearrangement of terms, the first order conditions (FOCs) of (7) are  
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Once again the FOCs essentially require equalisation of the net-of-tax marginal 
revenue product (MRP) of each input to its marginal cost (MFC), with the MRPs 
identical across the two modes of employment. But only the MFCs of the externally 
obtained capital and labour are now computed net of the tax. This introduces likely 
inconsistencies between conditions (7.1) and (7.2) and also between (7.3 and 7.4), as 
these require the MRPs of capital and labour to equal their marginal costs with, and at the 
same time without, tax relief. The dilemma was resolved in the previous section by 
adopting the WMCC as the relevant MFC for both Kc and Ke . As regards labour costs, 
the conditions can only be satisfied in the general case, if what we defined as the WMCL 
is also adopted as the MFC of both Kc and Ke . 
 
We can then, again, compress conditions (7.1) to (7.4) into only two. Substituting  
the specific functional form and assumed parameter values, and with  g still at 0.5, the 
FOC are now 
 
  5.10))(25.0)(5.87)(8.0( 5.075.0 

  LK
K f
et   (8.1) 
 9))(5.0)(5.87)(8.0( 5.025.0 

 LK
L f
et   (8.2) 
Proceeding as before we now find L = 2.333K or an L/K ratio of 2.333. That leads 
to new optimal values of, approximately, K = 42 and L = 98. Table 2 summarises the 
results in the column headed ‘Income Tax’ which shows that, compared with the no tax 
column, the firm would shrink to some 70% of the previous output level and experience 
an even greater, proportionately, reduction in profit.14 We can thus state: 
Proposition 1: A proportional income tax with relief on contractual inputs will reduce the 
employment of both contractual and entrepreneurial inputs, and hence the scale of final 
                                                 
14 We have avoided, for illustration purposes, selecting numbers that would make profit turn negative post tax. The 
profits shown here are somewhat exaggerated as a consequence. Real world ‘economic’ profits are generally small, and 
may well be negative after tax, especially for firms which may have difficulty recognising opportunity costs fully. As 
suggested already, the typical size of ‘economic’ profit makes it unsuitable to serve as the tax base. 
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output and post tax profit, of a profit maximising firm which maintains the pre tax 
gearing levels.  
 
As already seen however the optimisation of gearing is intertwined with decisions 
about scale. Under our specific assumptions here there is seems no reason why the firm 
should stick, under the tax, to the originally optimal g of 0.5. As is clear from Table 1, the 
firm would tend towards the theoretical limit of g = 1. As that is unrealistic we shall 
assume in what follows a new optimal g = 0.9 and recompute capital (and labour) unit 
costs accordingly. The equations of (8.1) and (8.2) now become 
 
  225.10))(25.0)(5.87)(8.0( 5.075.0 

  LK
K f
et   (9.1) 
2.8))(5.0)(5.87)(8.0( 5.025.0 

 LK
L f
et   (9.2) 
Adopting the earlier procedure, we calculate L = 2.494K. That produces new 
values of, approximately, K = 53.36 and L = 133.07. Table 2 summarises the results in 
the column headed ‘Income Tax w Gearing Adjustment’. It is evident that the gearing 
adjustment restores part of the firm’s pre tax scale and profit, correspondingly reducing 
its tax liability.  
 
Comparing the positions defined by (6.1) and (8.1) to (9.1), the employment of 
Kcf following the gearing adjustment goes to a higher absolute level (and a fortiori  
higher relative to Kef ) than in the absence of the tax. Kef on the other hand is reduced to a 
lower absolute level than even under (8.2). On balance, the tax relief, although limited to 
the contractual resources, means a larger level of firm output Qf  than that which would 
have applied in the absence of any relief.  Similar conclusions apply as regards the 
employment of Lcf  and  Lef . We may therefore state: 
 
Proposition 2:  A proportional income tax with relief on contractual inputs will reduce to 
a minimum the employment of entrepreneurial inputs, but increase contractual inputs to a 
level higher than pre tax, if the profit maximising firm adjusts gearing post tax. On 
balance the gearing adjustment will partially restore the scale and profit towards the pre 
tax level. 
 
Although the tax relief goes some way towards restoring the pre tax position, the 
increased use of contractual resources relative to entrepreneurial ones, (which may be an 
absolute increase under certain assumptions) remains a distortion occasioned by the 
income tax regime. Given the inevitability, however, of some form of tax on business a 
search for an alternative seems to be in order. 
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IV. Firm Decisions under Value Added Taxation 
 
The foregoing discussion has assumed a proportional income tax and no VA tax 
(although in reality VA tax and/or other sales taxes will be additional to income taxes).  
Suppose nevertheless, that instead of a tax on enterprise income there were a complete 
switch to an equal yield tax on VA at a rate v. Such a rate can be derived from the 
formula 
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   (10)15 
 
In view of the larger base of the VA tax, it will generally be the case that v< t  or 
that  v/t < 1. In effect the v rate is the t rate scaled down by entrepreneurial income as a 
proportion of VA. Alternatively, an income tax may be viewed as equivalent to one on 
VA, mitigated however by rebates on the cost of contractually employed factors and 
intermediate purchases. Applying this formula (see again Table 2) gives a v rate of 
approximately 0.14. 
 
Denoting profit after VA tax by πvt the after tax function of (7) would now 
become  
efefcfcffn
efefcfcfbbffvt
hLrKwLiKQPv
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)1(
])[1(
   (11) 
where only intermediate purchase costs (still taken as constant) are tax deductible. 
We proceed as in the previous section to derive the FOCs, from (11)  
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15 For comparability with the t rate the v rate is computed as a tax inclusive one. Value added tax is however usually 
levied at a tax exclusive rate. 
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The FOCs now require equalisation of the net of (VA) tax MRP of each input to 
its MFC. None of the factor costs are now computed net of tax, as no tax relief applies to 
any. Both factors in either mode of employment will be engaged up to the point of 
equality of the net of tax MRPs with the respective MCs, with no discrimination against 
the entrepreneurial inputs.  
 
Reducing to two equations, as before, and substituting the specific functional 
form and parameter values we now have 
 
 5.11))(25.0)(5.87)(86.0( 5.075.0 
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L f
vt   (12.2) 
Dividing the first equation by the second yields L = 2.3K which, after substitution 
back into the first equation gives the optimal value of K=37.8, from which also L = 
87.Table 2 sets out these results in the column headed ‘VA Tax’. 
 
Compared with all the previous results (12.1) and (12.2) define lower levels of K 
and L and hence a lower scale of Qf , lower even than under the income tax unadjusted 
for gearing in the second column. As VA tax does not favour either category of input no 
move to a better gearing ratio is possible here. Hence the amounts of Kc and Ke would 
also be the smallest, among the cases considered, save only for the amount of Ke which is 
reduced to a minimum in the third column, under the income tax relief. The reduction in 
output however enables the firm to achieve almost the same amount of post tax profit as 
under the income tax unadjusted for gearing (column 2) 
 
The firm in the VA regime in fact realises a larger post tax profit rate. as a 
percentage of turnover. That is unfortunately not a generalizable result, as the amount of 
VA tax paid is also not quite as large as under the income tax. This highlights the fact 
that, although aiming for equal yield tax rates, the formula of (10) does not quite achieve 
equality of yields ex post the optimisation exercises. For that we would need a rate 
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derived from the final tax yield of the calculation of column 2. Formula (10) will only 
produce ‘broadly equal’ yields from income and VA taxes and may be said to determine 
an ‘equivalent rate’. In summary we find: 
 
Proposition 3: A proportional VA tax at a rate equivalent to a proportional income tax 
will lead to   lower employment of both contractual and entrepreneurial inputs, and lower 
final output, tax yield and post tax profit, albeit possibly a higher profit rate. No 
adjustments in gearing are indicated.  
 
What is the welfare significance of a smaller firm under VA taxation? 
Counterintuitively, perhaps, it can be argued that the smaller scale dictated under such 
taxation is the most appropriate. Given that the firm must be taxed somehow, the no tax 
regime does not establish a realistic benchmark. The long established principle then is 
that taxation should be as neutral as possible. Income taxation in its various forms is 
arguably disorientating in encouraging efforts to minimise liability, by varying or 
reclassifying the input mix, and diverting attention from the search for productivity and 
identification of competitive advantage.  
 
 
  V. The Choice of Degree of Integration 
 
VA taxation has one discriminatory aspect in common with income taxation, in 
exempting bought in semi finished product, and taxing any internal intermediate (as 
opposed to final) production. Inputs in the form of semi-finished product, or 
subcontracted work are not part of VA and are thus tax deductible. Ceteris paribus the 
firm would be influenced in favour of buying in rather than producing internally. For this 
reason also the firm in the VA tax regime would tend to be smaller than it would be in the 
absence of this tax concession. 
 
The discussion so far has assumed a single intermediate input linked to final 
output through a fixed technical coefficient ( =1) and purchased externally at a fixed price  
Pb =0.125Pf.  But if that price where to rise, say to 0.15Pf  it is reasonable to suppose that 
the firm would consider some substitution of internal production, to say  Qs = 0.2Qf  and 
sourcing externally only Qb =0.8Qf , in effect opting for a higher level of vertical 
integration. There is an implied demand curve for external sourcing of semifinished 
product, given in this instance by  
 
Qb =2 - 8Pf   (13) 
 
which has a domain of  0.125 < Pb  < 0.25  and a range of  1 > Qb > 0. 
 
Since  Qs= Qf  – Qb , we also have 
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Qs= -1 + 8Pb          (14)  
 
and Qs now becomes a variable on a par with Qf. The decision variables of the 
optimisation problem, the amounts of the two categories of each input K and L, would 
now need to be differentiated further depending on whether they were employed in final 
or intermediate production. We would then have K = Kcf +Kef +Kcs +Kes and similarly  
L = Lcf + Lef + Lcs +Les, the second subscript referring to final or semi finished production. 
Assuming that the same production function governed both final output Qf and 
intermediate output Qs, the firm would maximise the following, rather cumbersome, 
modified version of eq (11)  
 
)()()()(])[1( esefesefcscfcscfbbfftv LLhKKrLLwKKiQPQPv   (14) 
 
We would then proceed to optimise the profit function as in the previous sections.  
Although some of the simplification applied earlier is possible, a full formal statement is 
probably unnecessary. It will be noted however that any switch to internal production Qs 
would be subject to VA tax. Not generating any sales revenue, Qs does not appear 
explicitly in (14) but is there in the form of increased input costs, not alleviated by any 
tax relief inside the bracketed VA expression. In view the discouragement of  internal 
production by the VA tax regime, the example of the previous section has illustrated the 
limiting case of Qs = 0. 
 
The choice of degree of integration is a strategic decision problem for the firm to 
make,  alongside others, such as margin vs market share, the trade off between quality 
and price, and (horizontal) diversification. The last possibility of the (smaller) firm also 
becoming less diversified than otherwise is relevant to the present discussion. For such a 
restriction in the firm’s scope, as well as scale, induced by a switch to value added 
taxation, would most probably also translate into greater specialisation in areas of core 
competence and competitive advantage. The switch would then represent a move in the 
direction of greater firm efficiency within the tax environment. 
 
Realisation of such efficiency potential would clearly depend on (i) how far the 
firm’s distinctive advantage lay in limited VA activities but also (ii) the removal of biases 
affecting the substitutability of entrepreneurial for contractual factor services. The 
literature on moral hazard in production is relevant here. We mention again, indicatively, 
Keuschnigg and Nielsen’s  (2004) analysis of the effects of the (income/capital) tax 
regime on entrepreneurial/venture capital effort incentives in the context of (possibly 
double-sided) moral hazard. These writers point to adverse tax effects on ‘effort’ between 
parties each of whom bears the whole of the cost of their increased effort but has to share 
with the other party the resulting revenue increase. Fairchild’s (2011) discussion of 
empathy and trust between entrepreneurs and angels (as opposed to venture capitalists) 
is also of relevance in the same context. 
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Unlike however the distinction between ‘entrepreneur’ and ‘capitalist’ of 
contributions such as the above, we have identified here all such input suppliers as 
‘entrepreneurial’, by virtue of their residual remuneration. We have indeed included 
residually remunerated ‘labour’ in the broader entrepreneurial category. It is the effort of 
all such participants, notwithstanding any tax (dis)incentives, that constitutes the main 
determinant of efficiency, both in production and in the selection of strategic alternatives. 
The relatively simple message that emerges here is that a tax regime which does not 
discriminate against entrepreneurial input engagement is more likely to favour pursuit of 
the effort rightly located in the wider domain of entrepreneurship. Qualities such as 
empathy and trust are also more likely to be developed among input suppliers 
contributing own ‘labour’. 
 
Other things equal, the firm should now prefer entrepreneurial to contractual 
employment of inputs, of labour as well as capital, as entrepreneurial engagement is more 
likely to release expenditure of effort.  Although not observable or verifiable, such effort 
and associated qualities are likely to be evidenced in efficient strategic choices, such as 
the avoidance of unnecessary intermediate production and inappropriate diversification. 
In view of widespread criticisms of ‘managerial’ behaviour in respect of such choices, 
emphasis on the entrepreneurial element in input selection seems to offer the best 
platform for efficient decisions. This, rather than the mechanics of the formal models, 
would be a reason for adjusting gearing in favour of towards the entrepreneurial inputs. 
We may state, if somewhat loosely, 
 
Proposition 4: A regime based on VA would favour entrepreneurial input employment as 
the likelier location of effort to improve efficiency in production and strategic choices 
oriented towards distinctive firm capabailities.  
 
 
VI.  Measurement of Riskiness under Alternative Taxes 
 
The potential effects of the asymmetry of (income) tax treatment on choices 
involving risk are, prima facie, ambiguous. There are mutually opposed influences at 
work. On the one hand, the greater than otherwise pre-emption of income to meet 
contractual commitments increases the riskiness of the residual accruing to the suppliers 
of entrepreneurial resources. That would encourage more risky choices to produce a 
larger residual. In the corporate world in particular “..the increased commitments to pay 
interest serve as an incentive to elicit greater efforts from entrenched managers. Thus, 
while a tax bias in favour of interest appears to encourage borrowing, it is harder to say 
whether it encourages too much borrowing” (Auerbach et al 2008, our emphasis). Equally, 
the increased riskiness of the residual may encourage attitudes of caution in the firm’s 
selection of products or projects. The perception of bankruptcy risk, possibly low at first, 
looms larger once a critical level of leverage is reached and that is indeed where the 
‘traditional’ view in finance would locate the point of optimal leverage. 
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We employ below an objective, in principle, measure of variability or volatility of 
after tax profit. Variability, essentially represented by the variance of the residual, is 
traced to potential movements in the externally given parameters, once the values of the 
decision variables have been selected. Such selection is taken to have been made in 
response only to the expected values (EVs) of the external parameters. 16 That is, the ex 
ante optimisation exercises of earlier sections precede the calculation of variability. The 
selected values of the decision variables, and hence also of output Qf, are treated as 
constants for purposes of the calculation.  To note also that the variability measure does 
not allow for subsequent adjustments in the values of the choice variables based on any 
evidence of variability becoming available ex post. 
 
Assume, as before,  perfect correlation between and Pf and Pb . Of the ten possible 
pairs of random variables Pn, i, r, w and h we assume, for simplicity, positive correlation 
between i and r and also between w and h, the other eight correlations being taken to be 
zero.  
The variance of the tax free profit of (5) is then 
 
),(2),(2
)()()()()()( 22222
hwCovLLriCovKK
hVarLrVarKwVarLiVarKPVarQVar
efcfefcf
efefcfcfnfe


  (15)  
 
The variance of profit after income tax in (7) would be  
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Comparing (15) with (16) by inspection we find that the first five terms are 
preceded by (1 – t)2 , the last two being identical. But the similarity of expressions 
conceals differences in the values taken by the variables in the respective optimal 
solutions. Referring back to Table 2, we find that the Qf  value of (16), corresponding to 
the ‘Income Tax’ column is some 70% of the Qf  of (15) i.e. the ‘No Tax’ column, while 
the values of the inputs of (16) are between 60% and 70% of those of (15). Each of the 
first five terms of (16) thus replicates a term in (15) preceded by a constant well below 1. 
While it seems that (16) defines a lower variance than (15), that has to be seen relative to 
the smaller scale of the of the post (income tax) profit of (16) unadjusted for gearing.17 
The comparison with the ‘adjusted gearing’ column, the variance of which is also 
represented by (16), is narrower still, as that solution involves output and input figures 
rather closer in total to those that corresponding to the no tax case of (15), and indeed 
                                                 
16  In the interests of simplicity the EVs of parameters are not shown in EV notation.  
17 Thus the coefficient of variation (= standard deviation/expected value) would be a more appropriate  measure. 
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exceeding those where the contractual inputs are concerned. Short of selecting arbitrary 
figures to illustrate the possible variation of price and input costs, we can unfortunately 
confirm nothing more here than the ambiguity that we started with. 
 
Our real interest however is in comparing risk behaviour across the two 
alternative tax regimes. For that we need to compute the variance of (11) which is  
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Comparison of that with (16), or indeed with (15), again does not seem to lead to 
an unambiguous result, especially when the probably lower absolute size of (17) is viewd 
in relation to the smaller size of the output and input variables of the solution headed ‘VA 
Tax’ in Table 2. The variance of the remaining equation  (14), corresponding to post VA 
tax profit with possible own itermediate production, would clearly not produce anything 
more definite and is omitted for the sake of brevity. 
 
Sad though it is to finish with a negative, we seem to have reached the limits of 
what the methodology employed in this section allows us to say about a firm’s risk 
bearing capacity under the alternative tax regimes hypothesised, and hence its likely 
behaviour in selecting risky projects.  
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
Difficulties of access to loan finance experienced by many firms have possibly 
reduced the advantages often associated with contractually engaged resources. That calls 
for a re-examination of the supposed tax advantages of debt and of the potential of value 
added taxation as non-discriminatory in respect of the choice between debt and equity 
finance but also, more generally, between any contractual and entrepreneurial resources.  
 
Using the standard ‘economic’ profit approach as the firm’s objective function, a 
detailed comparison has been undertaken of the effects of tax regimes based wholly on 
business income or wholly on value added. Specific functional forms have been utilised 
to exemplify the predicted effects of the tax regimes on the firm’s choices regarding the 
employment of inputs in the entrepreneurial or contractual mode, and the firm’s size and 
degree of vertical integration. An attempt has been made also to compare residual income 
volatility under the alternative regimes.  
 
The discussion supports the widely held expectation that tax neutrality in respect 
of choices between entrepreneurial and contractual input utilisation has certain desired 
efficiency effects. A switch towards value added taxation achieves such neutrality in 
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principle and is likely to confer advantages through greater use of entrepreneurial inputs 
and more effort among the suppliers of these. It is recognised that value added taxation,  
favours intermediate input purchases over internal value generation, thus making for a 
smaller firm. But the associated incentives to concentrate on core competences and make 
better strategic choices can produce efficiency and welfare gains.  
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APPENDIX 
 
AVERAGE AND MARGINAL FACTOR COSTS 
 
The general relationship used is
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Whereas these MFC formulae do not quite capture the full interdependence of the costs 
of the two types of factor, they have the advantage of expressing the effects of changes in 
terms of values of g only, i.e. without reference to the actual quantities of Kc and Ke. 
 
